Abstract-Today's power systems become more prone to cyber-attacks due to the high integration of information technologies. In this paper, we demonstrate that the outages of some lines can be masked by injecting false data into a set of measurements. The success of the topology attack can be guaranteed by making that: 1) the injected false data obeys Kirchhoff current law and Kirchhoff voltage law to avoid being detected by the bad data detection program in the state estimation and 2) the residual in the line outage detection is increased such that the line outage cannot be detected by phasor measurement unit data. A bilevel optimization problem is set up to determine the optimal attack vector that can maximize the residual of the outaged line. The IEEE 39-bus and 118-bus systems are used to demonstrate the masking scheme.
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I. INTRODUCTION

P
OWER grid, one of the critical infrastructures, is the backbone of a nation's economy and is critical to the homeland security. In particular, the blackouts happened around the globe in recent years have raised a great concern about the reliable and safe operation of power systems [1] . The topology of a power grid is critical to the security of a power system. When a line is on forced outaged, its power flow will be transferred to the remaining lines, which could overload some lines. If the system is under stressful condition, the outage of a single line can lead to cascading line outages, which brings a severe consequence to a power system [2] - [4] . It has been also shown that an attacker can identify the set of critical lines whose outages can lead to the maximum loss of load by solving a bilevel optimization problem [5] , [6] . Thus, if the control center is not aware of the potential risk or even does not detect such failures, then no corrective measures will be taken to mitigate the risk. As a result, the failures of the components would trigger the failures of more components and finally lead to the blackout. From the perspective of the system operator, it is essential to monitor the real-time operation state of a power system and detect the failures of components in time. PMUs provide a good solution to improve the reliability of power systems since the data has the advantages of GPS-synchronization, high accuracy and near real-time transmission as compared to conventional sensors. Thus, the deployment of PMUs for grid sensing is widely considered to be a major driving force for improving the reliability of transmission networks.
Utilizing the advantages of PMU data, some detection methods have been developed to detect the outages of lines. In [7] , the authors proposed a single line outage detection model based on the known network information and PMU data at a subset of buses. In their model, an enumeration approach was used to compute the responding residual value for each line. If the residual of a line is less than a predetermined threshold value, then this line is thought to be outaged. To overcome the difficulty of line combinations, Zhu and Giannakis in [8] formulated the outage problem as a sparse signal reconstruction problem. Greedy and coordinate descent based iterations were employed to obtain the optimal solution. Considering the high costs of deploying PMUs, the authors in [9] further explored the optimal placement strategy for PMUs. The objective is to minimize the number of PMUs to be deployed while maximizing the distance differences between every two-line outage combination. The problem is formulated as an integer programming problem, which is solved by greedy algorithm and improved branch and bound algorithm.
Note that the proposed line detection approach requires an operator to obtain the bus power injection measurements that are transmitted from installed sensors via communication networks. The open standards including standard PCs and operating systems, Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) and Ethernet communications and Internet access make the communication networks become the primary target of cyber-attacks [10] , [11] . In addition, the increasing penetration of renewable energies, such as wind, solar, increases the uncertainty of the power system. In other words, the transmitted data should be trusted with greater ranges due to a higher uncertainty of the system. This gives an attacker a good chance to modify the data transmitted to the control center. This enables an attacker to disrupt the line detection by injecting false data into a set of measurements. Liu et al. in [12] demonstrated that these attacks against state estimation can be undetectable by injecting the pre-designed false data into meters if the full topology and parameter information of a power grid is assumed to be known. Based on the corrupted data, the control center may make wrong decisions that lead to economic loss or insecure operations. Even worse, we in [13] and [14] showed that an attacker only needs to obtain the network information of a small part of the entire power network to launch such attacks.
Therefore, in the context of cyber security, it is necessary for the defender to reinvestigate the robustness of PMU data based detection of line outages. In this paper, we aim to investigate the possibility of masking line outages by launching false data injection attacks. That is, when a line is out of service, an attacker should send 0 to the control center to represent the line is disconnected. However, an attacker intends to modify this information from 0 to 1 to confuse the control center. To avoid being detected, false data is designed to make the received data are consistent with the case when the line is connected. Assume that a set of PMUs have been deployed to detect line outages. To achieve an undetectable attack, two conditions must be met: (1) the injected false data can avoid the bad data detection in state estimation; (2) the line outage cannot be detected by PMU data sent to the control center. In this paper, we will investigate the possibility of making line outages by injecting false data. Our focus is to mask the outage of a single line. The main contributions of this paper are three-fold:
(1) We for the first time demonstrate that line outages can be masked by disrupting the PMU data based outage detection by injecting false data. The principle is to increase the residual between the observed PMU angle changes and the calculated angle changes at the PMU buses. (2) We derive the analytical expression for the residual due to false data and mathematically explain the principle of increasing the residual by injecting false data. A linear programming problem is proposed to determine the optimal attack vector that maximizes the residual of the outaged line. (3) Our work reveals the vulnerability of the real-time topology to cyber-attacks and thus highlights the necessity for a defender to develop some effective protection strategies and corresponding detection methods. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the concept of false data injection attacks. Section III introduces the detection principle of line outages and formulates the masking scheme as a bilevel linear programming problem. Section IV proposes the solution methodology for the bilevel problem. Section V demonstrates the proposed model with the IEEE 39-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. FALSE DATA INJECTION ATTACKS
In this section, we review the models of false data injection attacks and the impacts of such attacks on the operation of power systems.
A. Principle of False Data Attacks
In the transmission network, the bus voltages are around the rating voltage and the phase angle differences of the terminal buses of a line are small. These characteristics allow us to describe the power flows using the linear Direct Current (DC) model. Based on DC power flow, we have
where matrix B is the susceptance matrix
Combining (1)- (3) into a compact form, we get
where
In DC state estimation, the state vector θ is estimated by the least square method
where z is the vector of measurements, and H is the Jacobian matrix of the power grid.
To check the validity of the transmitted data, the control center will perform bad data test which calculates the 2-norm value, or residue, of the error vector between the real measurements and corresponding estimated values. The residue r is
If the residue is less than a given threshold value, the estimated state θ is acceptable. Otherwise, bad data is thought to be existing. Thus, while performing the attacks, the attacker has to avoid being detected by bad data test. In particular, if the injection false data vector z and the state variation vector θ satisfy z = H θ , then we have
That is, the residue r will not increase, so false data injection attacks on measurements can bypass the residual test. Thus, such an attack is called undetectable false data injection attacks. It has been proved in [13] and [14] an attacker only needs to obtain the network information of the attacking region instead of that of the entire power network to construct the attack vector z. These further highlights the vulnerability of power systems to false data injection attacks since the attack cost will not be expensive.
B. Impacts of False Data Attacks
Driven by the pioneering work in [12] , extensive researches have been done to investigate the impacts of false data injection attacks on the economic and reliable operation of power systems. Yuan et al. in [15] proposed a bilevel optimization model to quantify the impact of false data on the security constrained economic dispatch (SCED) and showed that the operation cost could be significantly increased by the load redistribution attack. Xie et al. in [16] demonstrated that an attacker can gain some profit in a real-time electric market by compromising the locational marginal price(LMP) through launching false data attacks. Mo et al. [17] further pointed out that such attacks can also lead to the instability of a system. Later, it was revealed that some lines could be overloaded after SCED due to false data [18] , [19] . This is because SCED is performed according to the corrupted load data, not the actual load data. Accordingly, the calculated line flows may not be the same as the true line flows. Thus, a line will be overloaded if its true flow is greater than its calculated flow that is within the transmission limit.
Some countermeasures have also been developed to mitigate the risk of cyber-attacks. Kosut et al. in [20] showed that one can prevent a false data injection attack against state estimation by protecting a subset of sensors and phasor measurement units. A distributed algorithm was proposed to identify a least number of critical measurements to be protected [21] . Bi and Zhang in [22] transformed the optimal protection strategy into a variant Steiner tree problem. Both exact and approximate algorithms were proposed to determine the measurements to be protected. A quick detection method and machining learning detection approach were proposed in [23] and [24] , respectively. More detection methods can be found in [25] - [28] .
Recently, the research interest has been shifted to the vulnerability of the real-time topology of a power grid to cyber-attacks. The authors in [29] showed that the topology information sent to the control center can be attacked. They proposed a state-preserving model for a single line attack, in which a pair of additional powers is injected into the power measurements at the terminal buses of the attacked line. To overcome the practical issues in [29] , we proposed a practical topology attack model [30] in which the attacking amount at a bus is limited within a certain range and a heuristic algorithm was proposed to minimize the efforts of obtaining the network information for constructing a feasible attack vector. Li et al. in [31] showed that an attacker can mask the topology of a power grid by injecting false data into a set of measurements. That is, when a line is out of service, an attacker sends 1 to the control center to represent the line is still connected. To avoid being detected, false data is designed to make the received data are consistent with the case when the line is connected.
However, the proposed model in [29] - [31] is only suitable for the power grid without PMUs deployed for line outage detection. Consider a set of PMUs have been deployed to enhance the reliability of power systems. When a line is outaged, the bus phase angles at the PMU buses will change, which allow a defender to detect the outage of the line by using the algorithms proposed in [7] - [9] . The ignorance of PMUs in the existing works will make the proposed models impractical. To better capture the attack behavior of an attacker, it is necessary to reinvestigate the possibility of topology attacks by considering the protection role of PMUs. In this case, to achieve an undetectable attack, the injected false should be able to pass the line outage detection.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first introduce the principle of the line outage detection and then propose the masking scheme of line outages. A bilevel optimization problem is employed to determine the optimal attack vector.
A. Principle of Line Outage Detection
In power systems, the topology of a power grid provides the basis for economic operations and security controls. However, it is not invariable due to natural or malicious attacks or intentional line switching. Thus, to monitor the real-time topology of a power network, it is essential for the control center to detect the outages of lines.
In practice, when a line is physically disconnected, 0 will be sent to the control center to represent the line is disconnected. However, an attacker aims to stealthily modify this information from 0 to 1 so that the control center believes the line is still connected.
To ensure that such topology attack will not be detected by the state estimator, as discussed in [13] , the injected false data should obey KCL and KVL. When a line k is disconnected, the topology of the power grid will change. Accordingly, the power flow is determined using a new shift factor S k . However, consider the objective of an attacker is to mask the outage of this line. That is, the power flow should be consistent with the case that line k is still connected. So, the power flow is determined using the original shift factor S before the line outage. In this case, the received data will be trusted by the control center, the outage of this line is masked.
As discussed in Section I, the deployment of PMUs enables a defender to detect the outages of some lines based on PMU data. Thus, the success of such a topology attack not only needs the injected false data pass the bad data detection procedure in the state estimation, but also requires that the injected data can ensure the outage cannot be detected by PMU data.
Next, we first introduce the general mechanism of line outage detection [7] using PMU phasor data without the interruption of false data, i.e., D = 0.
Before the outage, the phase angle vector is calculated by θ pr e = B −1 P pr e (8) Similarly, the post-outage phase angle vector is calculated by
out,k P pr e (9) As shown in Fig. 1 , the line outage can be simulated by injecting additional powers p, − p at the terminal buses of the outaged line while keeping the topology of the power network unchanged [32] . That is, the outaged line is still assumed to be in service. By doing so, the recalculation of the matrix B −1 out for each outaged line can be avoided. Accordingly, the post-outage power injection vector becomes
where vector e is defined as
The additional power injection p is calculated by (11)
where f 0 k is the pre-outage flow of line kand γ is calculated as follows.
Accordingly, (9) becomes
Then, the calculated phase angle changes at PMU buses are given by (14) θ cal m,k = θ post,k s − θ pr e s (14) where the subscript s represents only the rows in θ post,k and θ pr e corresponding to the PMU buses are selected to calculate θ cal m,k . To detect if there is line outage and which line is on outage, we assume that line k is out of service and then calculate
where θ m,k is the observed phase angle change vector at PMU buses before and after the outage of line k. The original line flow f 0 k , which is before the outage of line k, is allowed to be variable to achieve the best match [7] .
As shown in figure 2 , without false data injection, the residual r k in (15) candidate line l, we calculate its corresponding residual r l according to (15) . The outaged line k is determined by examining the values of the residuals:
Line k that has the minimum residual value is identified as the outaged line.
B. Principle of Masking Line Outages
Notice that θ m,k comes from the actual readings of PMUs and thus represents the change of PMU phase angles before and after the line outage. In comparison, θ cal m,k is calculated using (15) according to the received measurements from remote sensors. This allows an attacker to control θ cal m,k by compromising the measurements transmitted from the power grid due to the vulnerability of communication networks. As shown in Fig. 2 , if an attacker injects false data z, then θ cal m,k is calculated using the corrupted data z = z + z. To differentiate from the case without false data, we use θ cal m,k to represent the calculated phase angle change after line k in outaged with false data z . But θ m,k still comes from the readings of PMUs that follow the system condition without false data injection. In this case, θ m,k and θ cal m,k are determined based on two different system conditions, making the resulting residual large. As a result, the outage of this line cannot be detected if its residual is increased to be greater than the minimum one. From the perspective of an attacker, in order to mask the outage of line, the goal is to increase the residual such that it is not the minimum one among the residuals of all candidate lines. DC power flow, so it obeys the superposition law. Suppose the load vector is modified by D, then the incremental power flow of line k is
So, the net power flow of line k becomes
Then, the additional power injection p added at the terminal buses becomes
So, we have
Under the disruption of injected false data, the equivalent post-outage power injection vector is P post,k = P pr e − V · D − e p = P pr e + γ f
Then, the phase angle vector after line k is outaged can be calculated as
Then, the calculated phase angle changes at PMU buses are given by (23) θ cal m,k = θ post,k s − θ pr e s (23) According to the principle of line outage detection [7] , with given D, the optimization problem (15) becomes
As the goal of an attacker is to increase the residual as much as possible, the entire problem can be formulated as a bilevel optimization problem shown in Fig.4 .
In the upper level, an injected false data D vector is determined to maximize the residual r k . If it is not the minimum one, then the outage of line k cannot be detected by PMU data. In the lower level, the operator minimizes r k by optimizing the value of the pre-outage line flow. The mathematical formulation of the optimization problem of determining an optimal attacker vector of line k is written as (25) :
subject to
Constraints (21)-(23)
The false data includes two parts: the injected false data D into the power injection measurements at load buses and the injected false data F into the corresponding line flow measurements. Constraint (26) calculates the injected line power flow vector F. Note that F is attributed to two parts: injected false power D and additional power f k used to simulate the line outage. The injected false data D is summed to zero (30) and the attacking amount at a load bus (except the terminal buses i, j ) is limited by constraint (27) . The power injections at the terminal buses are limited by constraints (28) and (29) . p is the equivalent power injections into the terminal buses used to simulate the line outage, P i and P j are the total false power injections at bus i and bus j , respectively. Constraints (31) and (32) represent that if a PMU is installed at a bus, then the power injection measurement and flow measurements of lines connected to this bus cannot be modified.
IV. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY
In this section, we propose an effective method to solve the bilevel optimization problem. The most popular methods to solve a bilevel optimization problem are the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) based approach [5] and duality based method [6] . However, the complimentary constraints in KKT based approach and bilinear terms in duality based method make the problem hard to solve. Fortunately, note that the lower level optimization only consists of linear equality constraints, which enables us to obtain the analytical expression of r k without solving a linear programming.
A. Solution to the Lower Level
In this section, we will present the optimization model for determining the optimal attack vector.
According to the principle of line outage detection discussed in Section A, to mask the outage of line k, an attacker needs to maximize the residual in (15) 
Introducing (21) into (36) yields
Calculate the derivative with respect to f 0 k , which gives
Solving the equation, we have
Introducing (43) into (40), we obtain 
where the matrix
We further define
Then, we have
This formula clearly shows that the residual can be attributed to two parts: the injected false data D and the term K . Without the injection of false data,
Compared (48) with (49), we can see that the false data D will impact the residual by the value of the term (α − G)· D. From the perspective of an attacker, the goal is to increase the residual as much as possible by carefully constructing D.
B. Construction of Attack Vector
After the objective value of the lower level problem can be written as (48). The original bilevel optimization problem is reduced to a single level problem (50):
Subject to
Constraints (26)-(32)
From the perspective of an attacker, the goal is to construct an optimal attack vector D to maximize the resulting residual r k . We rewrite (48) as
Note that (50) is a nonconvex optimization problem, which is hard to solve, especially for a large system. To overcome the computation difficulty, we propose the following alternative approach to obtain the optimal attack vector.
If we sum up all the rows of the matrices α − G, K to make a new row vectors (α − G) sum and a scalar K sum , constraint (53) holds
2 . This can be achieved by solving the flowing two linear programming (LP) problems:
Through the above transformation, the computation complexity of solving a nonconvex optimization problem can be avoided. The two LP problems can be effectively solved by using commercial solvers, such as Cplex and Gorubi.
The complete algorithm for determining an optimal attack vector for line k is summarized as follows:
Step 1: Obtain phase angle changes at PMU buses θ m,k .
Step 2: Extend θ m,k to θ E m,k with all entries for PMU buses copied from θ m,k and those for non-PMU buses set to zeros.
Step 3:
Compute the values of γ, α, β 1 , β 2 .
Step 4: Compute α − G, K and then sum up all the rows of the matrices α − G, K to make a new row vector (α − G) sum and a scalar K sum .
Step 5: Solving the two LP problems LP1 and LP2.
Step 6: Compare the values of ρ 1 and ρ 2 . If ρ 1 ≥ ρ 2 , D is determined by the solution of LP1; otherwise D is determined the solution of LP2.
Step 7: Construct the false data vector F DI .
As discussed in Section III, if the residual does not rank the lowest among all the candidate lines, then the outage of the line cannot be detected any more since the line with the minimum residual is presumed to be the outaged line. The effectiveness will be verified in the next section.
V. CASE STUDY
In this section, we first use the IEEE 39-bus system as an illustrative example and then test the masking scheme on the IEEE 118-bus system. We make the following assumptions:
• This system is fully measured. That is, we need one meter to measure the injection power for each bus and two meters to measure the power flow passing through each transmission line.
• An attacker can obtain the network information of the entire power network and attack all bus power injection measurements and line flow measurements.
A. Illustrative Example
The IEEE 39-bus system [33] is composed of 39 buses and 46 lines as shown in proposed masking scheme in detail. The PMU angle change vector before and after the line outage θ m,k is simulated using MATPOWER 4.1 based on the Alternating Current (AC) power flow model [33] . This is because the angle from the PMU measurement represents the actual phase angle at a bus in a real-world system that is described by the AC power flow. The original phase angle before the attack is calculated by (11) ,
Then, we disconnect line 25-26 and recalculate the power flow using MATPOWER. The post-outage phase angles at PMU buses become
So, the changes in the PMU phase angles due to the outage of line 25-26 are
PMU data are assumed to be noise-free due to its high accuracy. The standard deviations of non-PMU measurements are set to 1% of the actual values [34] . Table 1 ranks the top 5 lowest residuals determined by (15) without false data injection. We can see that the outaged line 25-26 has the lowest residual 0.0346, less than half of that of the line ranked Then, we inject the false injection data into the corresponding measurements at load buses. The maximum attacking amount at a load bus is no more than 50% of the load (i.e., τ = 0. Table 2 gives the injected false data for the terminal buses of line [25] [26] . The second column is the injected false load data. The third column represents the total false data needed to be injected at the terminal buses, which is the sum of the injected false load and the additional power used to simulate the outage of the line. The last column is the maximum attacking amount at a load bus. It can be seen from Table 2 that the injected false load data at buses 25 and 26 are −214.84MW and 396.34MW, which are greater than the maximum attacking amount 112MW and 69.5MW, respectively. However, when the additional powers 326.84 MW, −326.84 MW are added into buses 25 and 26, the net additional power injections at buses 25 and 26 become 112MW and 69.5MW, respectively. The attacking amounts at buses 25 and 26 are no more than their maximum attacking amount, so constraints (28) and (29) are satisfied. It is further verified that all the false data injections at load buses are summed to zero and limited within After the bad data is injected, the residuals of all candidate lines are recalculated using (49) and shown in Table 3 . Similar to Table 1 , only the top 5 lowest residuals are reported. It can be seen that the residual for line 25-26 ranks the fifth. Accordingly, its outage cannot be detected based the detection method in [7] - [9] , which requires the outaged line to have the minimum residual. In addition, constraints (26)- (30) ensure that the injected false data follow KCL and KVL and the attacking amounts are also limited within a reasonable range to avoid being detected.
B. IEEE 118-Bus System
Next, we test the attack scheme against the IEEE 118-bus system which consists of 118 buses and 186 lines. 48 PMUs are assumed to be installed at buses 1-45, 116, 117, 118 [35] . The lines whose outages will lead to the islanding of the power network are ignored. For the remaining 177 lines, we are interested in the set of lines whose outages can make the system under a high risk. The risk is evaluated using the security index proposed in [32] .
Where f l is the power flow of line l and f max l is the flow limit of line l.
For the IEEE 118-bus system, the top 10 lines (i.e., 8-5, 38-37, 38-65, 30-17, 26-30, 44-15, 64-65, 103-110, 100-103 and 15-17) with the highest security indices are considered as candidates for masking. Table 4 gives the simulation results of masking the outages of these ten lines for different values of τ . The number in the bracket ranks the corresponding residual among those of the 177 candidate lines. If the outaged line contributes to the minimum residual value, then its outage can be detected based on the calculated residual using (15) . For a greater τ , the residual r k will be increased. For example, when τ = 0.5, the residual of line 26-30 is 83.07; when τ = 1.0, the residual is increased to 156.65. This can be explained by the optimization problem (25) . As discussed, the objective of (25) is to maximize the value of the residual. As τ increases, the attacking amount at a bus becomes larger according to constraint (28)- (29) . Accordingly, the feasible region of the quadratic optimization gets larger, so its objective, the residual, will become larger.
We can also see from Table 4 that the injected false data can effectively mask the outages of lines. Overall, after false data are injected, the residual of line 64-65 ranks the 10 th lowest and the lowest of the residuals of the other lines (except 8-5, 38-65, 103-110) rank the 46 th . This indicates that the outages of these lines cannot be detected any more since the line with the minimum residual is presumed to be the outaged line. Additionally, there is a general trend that the rank of the residual of the outaged line increases as τ increases. For instance, line 38-37 has the 47th lowest residual if τ = 0.5. However, when τ = 1.0 and we inject the false data D determined by (25) , the residual is increased to 101.41, which ranks the 100 th lowest among the 177 candidate lines.
It is observed that the outages of two lines (i.e., lines 38-65, 103-110) under consideration cannot be masked. This can be also explained by the optimization problem (25) . Since the attacking amount D is limited within a certain range, the increase in the residual due to the false data is thus limited. So, if the minimum residual of the outaged line cannot be increased significantly compared to those of the rest lines, then such an attack scheme might not be able to mask the line outage. We use line 103-110 as an example to illustrate this point. When τ = 0.5, the residual is increased to 24.01, but it is still less than the second lowest one 26.45. So, the outaged of this line can still be detected although the attacker has injected false data to disrupt the line outage detection. The same trend applies for τ = 1.0 and τ = 1.5. Hence, an attacker cannot inject false data to mask its outage. For line 38-65, when τ is further increased to 2.5 (not shown in Table 5 ), the significant increase in the residual compared to those of the rest lines will make its can be masked by injecting the false data since its residual rank the 36 th lowest, not the lowest.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Smart grids are subject to the high risk of cyber-attacks due to the highly integrations of communication networks. In this paper, we further demonstrate that an attacker can mask the outage of a single line by injecting false data into a set of measurements. A bilevel optimization problem is set up to determine the optimal attack vector that can maximize the residual of the outaged line.
The success of line outage detection depends on whether the outaged line can generate the minimum residual. Consequently, if the proposed attack scheme can increase the residual significantly, such an outage cannot be detected. This motivates us to develop effective countermeasures against such attacks, which is a very challenging problem to be addressed in a future work. We are considering two possible countermeasures. The first one is to protect a set of critical measurements. The technical challenge is to identify such critical measurements using an efficient algorithm. The second countermeasures are to develop more secure detection approaches for line outages. Engineering Department, IIT. His research interests include economic and secure operation of electric power systems, cyber security in smart grid, renewable energy integration, electric demand management of data centers, and power system protection.
